Friday 22 August 2025 Grand Strategy Newsletter On Knowing How to History The View from Oregon – 355 mailchi.mp/e8880623ba94/the-view-from-oregon-355 …in which I discuss knowing that and knowing how, Gilbert Ryle, historical reenactment, moral panics, the witchcraze, Iris Murdoch, recovering past passions and enthusiasms, the rage of Achilles, never again, and Elaine Pagels on the Gospel of Thomas…
Ontological Saturation.—One way in which a concept can be considered narrow would be because only one (or a few) objects fall under its extension. This is the case of “natural satellite of the Earth”—an example employed by Frege. This example, however, isn’t necessarily narrow in the sense of having a narrow extension; it is in another sense a highly general concept because it is a special case of the very general concept of a moon. If, at some future date, the solar system is flooded with many asteroids, say, from some extraterrestrial close encounter, the Earth could acquire many additional natural satellites, and then the concept “natural satellite of Earth” could have a great many objects fall under its extension. The fact that this concept can have a changing extension reflects a generality compatible with its current narrowness. The conceptual simplicity of “natural satellite of Earth” betrays its generality, even if a single object, or no object at all, falls under the concept; in this case, the intension is simple, and that simplicity can yield a narrow or a wide extension. A complex intension more readily yields a narrow extension, and an intension might be narrow in more than one way, but that is because there are an infinitude of forms of particularism that could render an intension narrow. We can arrive at particularism by specifying many properties (restricting the extension by expanding the intension) or through the use of highly particularistic concepts, but highly particularistic concepts are naturally complex, i.e., they tacitly incorporate a greater complexity of intension. The concept “natural satellite of Earth” can be made less complex by eliminating the qualifier “natural” and by substituting any planet for “Earth,” but it can also be made more complex by specifying the diameter or orbital distance or even surface features of the natural satellite. When we think of “The Moon” in all is particularity we could be said to entertain the concept of the Moon, but this is misleading, like Hegel’s “concrete universal,” which isn’t a concept at all. A concept is, as Frege noted, “unsaturated,” but any concrete individual is particular in virtue of its ontological saturation.
TODAY IN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: Are subsurface ocean worlds Plato’s cave?
The allegory of the cave is Plato’s great thought experiment in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, and subsequent philosophy has produced countless variations on Plato’s theme, which is the distinction between appearance and reality. Reading Plato against the grain, I take the allegory of the cave from a naturalistic perspective and explore how certain environments approximate or fail to approximate the dilemma of Plato’s cave, and what this entails for our knowledge of the universe we inhabit.
Growth and Contraction.—There is a sense in which scholarship incorporates into itself conventions that allow individuals with very different instincts to collaborate. Note the collaboration is a higher standard of cooperation than communication, and a much higher standard of cooperation than mutual participation in civil society. We can effectively communicate with many more individuals than those with whom we can collaborate, and we can mutually participate in civil society with a yet much larger number of individuals than with whom we can communicate. In an open and growing society, the increasing integration of civil society contributes to the expansion of communication, and the expansion of communication contributes to wider collaboration as greater numbers of persons are drawn into actively participating in society. On the other hand, one of the hallmarks of a hidebound and stagnant society that there is an attempt to exclude those with whom we cannot effectively cooperate in civil society, making the scope of civil society as narrow as that of the scope of cooperation.
Friday 15 August 2025 Grand Strategy Newsletter The View from Oregon – 354 A Recapitulation Model of Cosmological History mailchi.mp/1417e482f3fd/the-view-from-oregon-354 …in which I discuss Polybius on historical cycles, Vico on ideal eternal history, Schopenhauer, the liberty of indifference, recapitulation, historical codas, a contingent interpretation of inevitability, cosmologically local cyclicality, and the anachronism of preserving present complexity regimes into the far future…
There is more than one way to enter into a given philosophical tradition.
Thomas Williams in his lectures “Reason and Faith: Philosophy of the Middle Ages” said that the philosophical project of the Middle Ages was “faith seeking understanding,” and he says in these lectures, “Their project is my project.” That’s one way to enter into a philosophical tradition.
I don’t share Williams’ interest in the philosophical project of the Middle Ages, but I do share his interest in the philosophy of the Middle Ages. I can say of Augustine, for example, that the questions he asked and attempts to answer are the questions that interest me. So I could say, “Their questions are my questions.” That’s another way to enter into a philosophical tradition.
Of course, these two overlap, “Their project is my project” and “their questions are my questions” obvious will share much of their substance. It’s a difference of emphasis and approach.
TODAY IN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: Five Are Executed at Salem for Witchcraft
On Tuesday 19 August 1692—333 years ago today—five persons accused, tried, and found guilty of witchcraft were hanged, probably at Procter’s Ledge in Salem, Massachusetts. Was this an historical anomaly, an exception to what we should expect in the course of human events, or was it, rather, a predictable instance of mass hysteria driven by a moral panic? Is it, in fact, so predictable that we find ourselves acting out a script of cyclical history despite our insistence upon our free will and historical agency?
The Paleontology of Knowledge.—A fossil observation could be defined as an observation made under a different epistemic regime than that of today, so that to treat it as an observation for the purposes of contemporary knowledge it has to be interpreted within the contemporary epistemic paradigm. This translation from one epistemic paradigm to another will always pose problems of translation (pace Quine on the indeterminacy of translation). A later human civilization may have to translate our science into terms that made sense for them, allowing for our ellipses and our eccentric biases, as we attempt to translate past systematic attempts to formulate knowledge into our own systematic attempt to formulate knowledge, but there will never be any precise equivalents because of the indeterminacy of translation. This is a humbling realization for us, since our epistemic regime places a high value on precision, but another interesting consequence follows from this. All historical observations are fossil observations, with the possible exception of the history of the present. But the history of the present might just as well be called primary source material and not really history at all; we might with some justification reserve the term “history” only for accounts of the past written in an era following an era which has lapsed. Or we could simply distinguish history based on fossil observations and history based on living observations, but however we do it, the longer the period of history that we cover, the more likely we are to make use of fossil observations. Is it this that has prevented history from becoming a science, because history attempts to combine into a single synthesis fossil observations from several distinct epistemic regimes, none of which are commensurable?
Friday 08 August 2025 Grand Strategy Newsletter The View from Oregon – 353 How many Charlemagnes are there? mailchi.mp/7a374499b78d/the-view-from-oregon-353 …in which I discuss evolutionary convergence, the rare Earth hypothesis, the rare humanoid hypothesis, peer complexity, historical convergence, a disturbing SETI transmission, being “close enough” to be “the same,” cosmological-scale cyclical history, inevitability, the Fermi paradox, a universe full of Caesars and Charlemagnes, and The Precipice…
Observational Fossils.—Given that a lone contemporary (or even predecessor) of Copernicus could have formulated heliocentricism with evidence then available, and that this discovery might have gone entirely unnoticed, we could frame another speculative scenario in which the lost and re-discovered astronomical work contained some innovation not known to Copernicus, and possibly not even known to us. In this scenario, the lost and re-discovered manuscript is not a mere historical curiosity, but a striking and perhaps even revolutionary contribution to thought. We have long passed the point where ancient observations could force any revision in our scientific theories, so we can rule out the possibility of any contribution in the form of improved techniques or technologies of observation. However, the discovery of an observation since lost or forgotten, like the lunar observations on 18 June 1178 recorded by Gervase of Canterbury, postulated to have been the impact that formed the Giordano Bruno crater on the moon, might make us aware of something we didn’t otherwise know about, which can then be assimilated not only into contemporary knowledge, but also the observations themselves can be assessed from the perspective of contemporary methodology. Precisely because we do subject such observations to contemporary critique, the further any observations recede into the past, the more likely they are to be questioned and the less compelling the evidence appears. The 1178 observations remain controversial because of the vernacular in which they were described and the lack of confirmation from independent sources. Such observations can be theoretically fruitful in the sense that they pose a problem for the explanation of what exactly was observed. Past observations, then, can be of some value, but can we say the same for theory? Can we make a clean distinction between observation and theory that would allow for theory to remain viable even as observation becomes problematic? Could any past theoretical innovation be valuable to contemporary science, so that some long lost manuscript contained unknown secrets of the cosmos? While for the purposes of philosophy of science we may want to distinguish observational and theoretical terms, in practice observation and theory are tightly-coupled: observations drive theory and theory drives further observation. This means that the increased precision of observation drives increased precision in theory, and both are carried forward together by increased precision of measurement. Once the error bars of measurement exceed the observational parameters of past theory, both observation and theory of two distinct periods of human knowledge increasingly diverge, and their relevance to each other declines. This may be one mechanism of paradigm shift, but it’s not only such mechanism.
Nick Nielsen
Friday 22 August 2025
Grand Strategy Newsletter
On Knowing How to History
The View from Oregon – 355
mailchi.mp/e8880623ba94/the-view-from-oregon-355
…in which I discuss knowing that and knowing how, Gilbert Ryle, historical reenactment, moral panics, the witchcraze, Iris Murdoch, recovering past passions and enthusiasms, the rage of Achilles, never again, and Elaine Pagels on the Gospel of Thomas…
Substack: geopolicraticus.substack.com/p/on-knowing-how-to-h…
Medium: jnnielsen.medium.com/knowing-how-to-history-e502ae…
Reddit: www.reddit.com/r/The_View_from_Oregon/comments/1n3…
1 week ago | [YT] | 2
View 0 replies
Nick Nielsen
Ontological Saturation.—One way in which a concept can be considered narrow would be because only one (or a few) objects fall under its extension. This is the case of “natural satellite of the Earth”—an example employed by Frege. This example, however, isn’t necessarily narrow in the sense of having a narrow extension; it is in another sense a highly general concept because it is a special case of the very general concept of a moon. If, at some future date, the solar system is flooded with many asteroids, say, from some extraterrestrial close encounter, the Earth could acquire many additional natural satellites, and then the concept “natural satellite of Earth” could have a great many objects fall under its extension. The fact that this concept can have a changing extension reflects a generality compatible with its current narrowness. The conceptual simplicity of “natural satellite of Earth” betrays its generality, even if a single object, or no object at all, falls under the concept; in this case, the intension is simple, and that simplicity can yield a narrow or a wide extension. A complex intension more readily yields a narrow extension, and an intension might be narrow in more than one way, but that is because there are an infinitude of forms of particularism that could render an intension narrow. We can arrive at particularism by specifying many properties (restricting the extension by expanding the intension) or through the use of highly particularistic concepts, but highly particularistic concepts are naturally complex, i.e., they tacitly incorporate a greater complexity of intension. The concept “natural satellite of Earth” can be made less complex by eliminating the qualifier “natural” and by substituting any planet for “Earth,” but it can also be made more complex by specifying the diameter or orbital distance or even surface features of the natural satellite. When we think of “The Moon” in all is particularity we could be said to entertain the concept of the Moon, but this is misleading, like Hegel’s “concrete universal,” which isn’t a concept at all. A concept is, as Frege noted, “unsaturated,” but any concrete individual is particular in virtue of its ontological saturation.
1 week ago | [YT] | 2
View 0 replies
Nick Nielsen
TODAY IN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: Are subsurface ocean worlds Plato’s cave?
The allegory of the cave is Plato’s great thought experiment in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, and subsequent philosophy has produced countless variations on Plato’s theme, which is the distinction between appearance and reality. Reading Plato against the grain, I take the allegory of the cave from a naturalistic perspective and explore how certain environments approximate or fail to approximate the dilemma of Plato’s cave, and what this entails for our knowledge of the universe we inhabit.
Quora: philosophyofhistory.quora.com/
Discord: discord.gg/r3dudQvGxD
Links: jnnielsen.carrd.co/
Newsletter: eepurl.com/dMh0_-/
Video: https://youtu.be/oNLZmMJjpc4
Podcast: open.spotify.com/episode/6E32LYSKdewhgNfykEEskZ?si…
#philosophy #history #PhilosophyofHistory #Plato’sCave #AllegoryoftheCave #astrobiology #civilization #SETI #waterworld #SubsurfaceOcean #cosmology #intelligence #FermiParadox #Unwelt #habitability
1 week ago | [YT] | 3
View 0 replies
Nick Nielsen
Growth and Contraction.—There is a sense in which scholarship incorporates into itself conventions that allow individuals with very different instincts to collaborate. Note the collaboration is a higher standard of cooperation than communication, and a much higher standard of cooperation than mutual participation in civil society. We can effectively communicate with many more individuals than those with whom we can collaborate, and we can mutually participate in civil society with a yet much larger number of individuals than with whom we can communicate. In an open and growing society, the increasing integration of civil society contributes to the expansion of communication, and the expansion of communication contributes to wider collaboration as greater numbers of persons are drawn into actively participating in society. On the other hand, one of the hallmarks of a hidebound and stagnant society that there is an attempt to exclude those with whom we cannot effectively cooperate in civil society, making the scope of civil society as narrow as that of the scope of cooperation.
1 week ago | [YT] | 3
View 3 replies
Nick Nielsen
Friday 15 August 2025
Grand Strategy Newsletter
The View from Oregon – 354
A Recapitulation Model of Cosmological History
mailchi.mp/1417e482f3fd/the-view-from-oregon-354
…in which I discuss Polybius on historical cycles, Vico on ideal eternal history, Schopenhauer, the liberty of indifference, recapitulation, historical codas, a contingent interpretation of inevitability, cosmologically local cyclicality, and the anachronism of preserving present complexity regimes into the far future…
Substack: geopolicraticus.substack.com/p/a-recapitulation-mo…
Medium: jnnielsen.medium.com/a-recapitulation-model-of-cos…
Reddit: www.reddit.com/r/The_View_from_Oregon/comments/1mx…
1 week ago | [YT] | 1
View 0 replies
Nick Nielsen
There is more than one way to enter into a given philosophical tradition.
Thomas Williams in his lectures “Reason and Faith: Philosophy of the Middle Ages” said that the philosophical project of the Middle Ages was “faith seeking understanding,” and he says in these lectures, “Their project is my project.” That’s one way to enter into a philosophical tradition.
I don’t share Williams’ interest in the philosophical project of the Middle Ages, but I do share his interest in the philosophy of the Middle Ages. I can say of Augustine, for example, that the questions he asked and attempts to answer are the questions that interest me. So I could say, “Their questions are my questions.” That’s another way to enter into a philosophical tradition.
Of course, these two overlap, “Their project is my project” and “their questions are my questions” obvious will share much of their substance. It’s a difference of emphasis and approach.
1 month ago | [YT] | 11
View 0 replies
Nick Nielsen
TODAY IN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: Five Are Executed at Salem for Witchcraft
On Tuesday 19 August 1692—333 years ago today—five persons accused, tried, and found guilty of witchcraft were hanged, probably at Procter’s Ledge in Salem, Massachusetts. Was this an historical anomaly, an exception to what we should expect in the course of human events, or was it, rather, a predictable instance of mass hysteria driven by a moral panic? Is it, in fact, so predictable that we find ourselves acting out a script of cyclical history despite our insistence upon our free will and historical agency?
Quora: philosophyofhistory.quora.com/
Discord: discord.gg/r3dudQvGxD
Links: jnnielsen.carrd.co/
Newsletter: eepurl.com/dMh0_-/
Text post: geopolicraticus.substack.com/p/five-witches-are-ex…
Video: https://youtu.be/q5ojPn_64Qo
Podcast: open.spotify.com/episode/4HAzDJUwloZlwnSy6q86XL?si…
#philosophy #history #PhilosophyofHistory #witchcraft #Salem #witchcraze #hysteria #MoralPanic #Trevor-Roper #CyclicalHistory
2 months ago | [YT] | 3
View 0 replies
Nick Nielsen
The Paleontology of Knowledge.—A fossil observation could be defined as an observation made under a different epistemic regime than that of today, so that to treat it as an observation for the purposes of contemporary knowledge it has to be interpreted within the contemporary epistemic paradigm. This translation from one epistemic paradigm to another will always pose problems of translation (pace Quine on the indeterminacy of translation). A later human civilization may have to translate our science into terms that made sense for them, allowing for our ellipses and our eccentric biases, as we attempt to translate past systematic attempts to formulate knowledge into our own systematic attempt to formulate knowledge, but there will never be any precise equivalents because of the indeterminacy of translation. This is a humbling realization for us, since our epistemic regime places a high value on precision, but another interesting consequence follows from this. All historical observations are fossil observations, with the possible exception of the history of the present. But the history of the present might just as well be called primary source material and not really history at all; we might with some justification reserve the term “history” only for accounts of the past written in an era following an era which has lapsed. Or we could simply distinguish history based on fossil observations and history based on living observations, but however we do it, the longer the period of history that we cover, the more likely we are to make use of fossil observations. Is it this that has prevented history from becoming a science, because history attempts to combine into a single synthesis fossil observations from several distinct epistemic regimes, none of which are commensurable?
2 months ago | [YT] | 13
View 0 replies
Nick Nielsen
Friday 08 August 2025
Grand Strategy Newsletter
The View from Oregon – 353
How many Charlemagnes are there?
mailchi.mp/7a374499b78d/the-view-from-oregon-353
…in which I discuss evolutionary convergence, the rare Earth hypothesis, the rare humanoid hypothesis, peer complexity, historical convergence, a disturbing SETI transmission, being “close enough” to be “the same,” cosmological-scale cyclical history, inevitability, the Fermi paradox, a universe full of Caesars and Charlemagnes, and The Precipice…
Substack: geopolicraticus.substack.com/p/how-many-charlemagn…
Medium: jnnielsen.medium.com/how-many-charlemagnes-are-the…
Reddit: www.reddit.com/r/The_View_from_Oregon/comments/1mr…
2 months ago | [YT] | 6
View 0 replies
Nick Nielsen
Observational Fossils.—Given that a lone contemporary (or even predecessor) of Copernicus could have formulated heliocentricism with evidence then available, and that this discovery might have gone entirely unnoticed, we could frame another speculative scenario in which the lost and re-discovered astronomical work contained some innovation not known to Copernicus, and possibly not even known to us. In this scenario, the lost and re-discovered manuscript is not a mere historical curiosity, but a striking and perhaps even revolutionary contribution to thought. We have long passed the point where ancient observations could force any revision in our scientific theories, so we can rule out the possibility of any contribution in the form of improved techniques or technologies of observation. However, the discovery of an observation since lost or forgotten, like the lunar observations on 18 June 1178 recorded by Gervase of Canterbury, postulated to have been the impact that formed the Giordano Bruno crater on the moon, might make us aware of something we didn’t otherwise know about, which can then be assimilated not only into contemporary knowledge, but also the observations themselves can be assessed from the perspective of contemporary methodology. Precisely because we do subject such observations to contemporary critique, the further any observations recede into the past, the more likely they are to be questioned and the less compelling the evidence appears. The 1178 observations remain controversial because of the vernacular in which they were described and the lack of confirmation from independent sources. Such observations can be theoretically fruitful in the sense that they pose a problem for the explanation of what exactly was observed. Past observations, then, can be of some value, but can we say the same for theory? Can we make a clean distinction between observation and theory that would allow for theory to remain viable even as observation becomes problematic? Could any past theoretical innovation be valuable to contemporary science, so that some long lost manuscript contained unknown secrets of the cosmos? While for the purposes of philosophy of science we may want to distinguish observational and theoretical terms, in practice observation and theory are tightly-coupled: observations drive theory and theory drives further observation. This means that the increased precision of observation drives increased precision in theory, and both are carried forward together by increased precision of measurement. Once the error bars of measurement exceed the observational parameters of past theory, both observation and theory of two distinct periods of human knowledge increasingly diverge, and their relevance to each other declines. This may be one mechanism of paradigm shift, but it’s not only such mechanism.
2 months ago | [YT] | 2
View 0 replies
Load more